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              Abstract 
 
 
The paper focuses on market power by certain countries in specific commodity markets 
as a crucial factor in explaining the level of protection. It is argued that a country which is 
a price maker in the world market of a specific commodity might affect its world price 
through export taxes, import taxes and commodity stockpiling. Standard reduced form 
equations were estimated to test if significant market shares in international markets of 
Brazilian coffee, Chilean saltpetre and US cotton implied domestic variables were 
relevant for the determination of the corresponding world commodity prices.  Results 
suggest the producers succeeded in passing through increases in internal costs to the 
relevant world commodity price. 
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There has been a large number of recent contributions trying to explain the long-
term trends of tariff levels in different economies and the links between protection and 
growth.
4 Concern here is on extending the list of factors that might explain different tariff 
histories rather than on the tariff-growth controversies, although there might be important 
implications in the proposed revision of factors affecting tariffs which might improve the 
understanding of growth performance under different protectionist scenarios.
5 Attention 
is focused on the analysis of long-term protection in two big Latin American economies 
using the much better studied case of the United States as a counterpoint. Arguments 
presented here may also affect the explanation of variations in levels of protectionism in 
other regions besides Latin America. 
 
In this recent literature surprise has been expressed on the high level of nominal 
tariffs in Latin American tariffs much earlier than suggested by those who used to single 
out the 1928-1933 depression as a watershed marking the transition to a period of higher 
protection. Indeed, in the last quarter of the 19
th century, levels of protection were already 
rather high and remained so, especially in Brazil and Colombia. Political economy 
reasons have been advanced to stress that this might be expected as in Latin America 
economic policies favoured the protectionist interests of urban capitalists and that 
landowners have never managed to dominate national politics.  
 
While having the virtue of drawing general attention to the rather early high level 
of tariffs in Latin America, this literature fails to take into account essential factors which 
might have been important to explain the level of tariffs. The focus here is on market 
power by certain countries in specific commodity markets as a crucial factor in the 
explanation of the history of protection. In the same way that an export tax on the 
commodity exported by a price maker affects the world price of such commodity, import 
taxes on inputs used to produce commodity exports affect the world supply of the 
                                                 
4 See Coatsworth and Williamson (2004) and Clemens and Williamson (2001).   
5 Irwin (2002) has stated the case that there is no causal link between tariff and growth as suggested by 
O’Rourke (2000) and Clemens and Williamson (2001), stressing the importance of outliers and that land-
abundant countries (only Argentina and Canada mentioned) relied on tariffs for revenue purposes.   3
commodity via marginal cost conditions with a similar consequence on world commodity 
prices.
6 A high level of import tariff has thus rather different implications in a small 
economy which is a price taker in the world export markets and in a “big” economy 
which has market power in the relevant world market. In an economy which is big in a 
commodity market, there might be also different possible combinations of export taxes 
on the relevant commodity and import taxes on imported inputs. This suggests that 
import and export taxes should be considered jointly. It may also be mentioned that there 
are significant measurement problems related to long-term data on tariffs computed as a 
ratio between tax revenue and value of imports as import trade statistics in Latin America 
were based on official prices until a rather late period. This significantly affects estimates 
of average tariff levels for several Latin American big economies. If this is corrected by 
computing the value of export trade of main partners using a Morgenstern-type 
methodology it can be shown that tariff levels were significantly smaller than suggested 
in the literature for most big Latin American economies at least until the turn of the 19




Interpretations based on the political economy of protection which have been 
proposed in this literature on the relative influence of a supposedly liberally inclined 
landowning class and the emergent industrialists also seem unsatisfactory.
8 The assertion 
that Latin American economic policies favoured protectionist interests of urban 
capitalists and that landowners have never managed to dominate national politics 
certainly cannot be generalized. This is most clear when the evidence on Brazil is taken 
into account, possibly due to the fact that, oddly enough, most analyses have simply 
abstained from dealing with the history of protection in this particular economy, even if 
noting how high its tariff was. For a country where coffee stockpiling took place under 
the auspices of the Federal government since 1907, then again in the 1920s, and then in 
the 1930s to face the collapse of world coffee prices, the assertion that landowning 
                                                 
6 Abreu and Bevilaqua (2000) discussed this hypothesis for coffee and Brazil. Fernandes (2002) extended 
the treatment to cover also rubber, cotton and saltpetre for Brazil, the United States and Chile, respectively.  
7 See Morgenstern (1963), ch. IX. See Abreu (2004), Table 2, for tariff estimates based on partner export 
statistics for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico for 1880, 1900, 1913 and 1928. See 
Estevadeordal (1997) for a discussion of biases affecting different measures of protection for most 
European economies, Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United Sates in 1913.  
8 Coatsworth and Williamson (2004), pp. 53 and ff.    4
interests never managed to dominate national politics – and economic policies – seems 
unwarranted. The theme of possibly opposing interests between coffee and industrial 
interests in Brazil before the 1928-1933 depression has been the subject of copious 
literature which stresses that it was rather a question of coffee and industry rather than of 
coffee versus industry.
9 Evidence shows that a high proportion of industrialists were in 
fact diversifying coffee growers. In any case, given that Brazil could use its market power 
to shift the impact of the tariff to world coffee prices any proposed conflict of interests 
between coffee and industry would lose much of its importance. 
 
In other big Latin American economies such as Argentina the evidence also does 
not fit easily with the interpretation that economic policies favoured protectionist 
interests of urban capitalists and thus the tariff was high. The average tariff was not still 
higher because landowners were unwilling to face increased costs of imported inputs 
which would entail either an erosion of mark-ups or a loss in market share as they had no 
market power as suppliers of food. Much of the protection was concentrated on mass-




In the next section the links between commodity prices, export taxes, import 
tariffs and commodity price support are analyzed for economies with market power in the 
supply of their main commodity exports. In section 2 it is argued that three countries have 
to a varying extent met the above conditions: the United States during antebellum cotton 
period (1826-1859), Brazil for coffee (1880-1930) and rubber (1880-1912) and Chile for 
saltpetre (1880-1930). Other economies could possibly qualify but there are difficulties 
preventing their inclusion. For instance, there is no reliable information on Peru as a 
supplier of guano before 1880. In India, in second half of the 19
th century, the tea 
producing sector was not as significant part of the economy as in the other cases. Section 
3 is on the basic model used to test the hypothesis whether there is a link between the 
                                                 
9 Dean (1969) is the standard reference on the subject. 
10 Solberg (1987), p. 106 points out that in Argentina before 1930 there was a “relative absence of 
concerted government support of industrialization”.   5
level of tariffs and the price of commodities in the selected economies. In section 4 the 
empirical results are presented and discussed. The final section concludes. 
 
1. Market power and commodity prices 
 
The initial focus here is on the link between import tariff and commodity prices in 
cases where specific economies had market power in the markets for such commodities. 
Several such economies existed in different moments of world economic history. Most of 
them were rather backward at the time the right conditions applied. They had market 
power in specific commodity markets as they produced a significant share of the world 
output of such commodities. The commodity-producing sector was important in the 
domestic economy as a whole. Had this not been the case, other factors might 
significantly weaken the link between import tariff fluctuations and the world price of the 
specific commodity produced by this economy. 
 
The issue of how market power of the United States in the world cotton market 
might have justified an optimal import tariff in the United States has been the subject of 
controversy. Taussig (1931) had argued that the United States’ import tariff improved the 
terms of trade due to market power in the world raw cotton market. James (1981) used a 
simplified computable general equilibrium model to show that, since the United States 
was a dominant world supplier of cotton, the high U.S. tariff improved the United States’ 
terms of trade. Harley (1992) has pointed problems with this approach and argued, using 
a modified CGE model, that improvement in the terms of trade resulted from poor 
specification of the rest of the world and that the tariff had no important terms of trade 
effects because the United States’ marginal export was food not cotton. In the world food 
market the United States was a minor supplier and international demand for United States 
food was elastic. Hence, the United States possessed market power in raw cotton but the 
tariff could not exploit it because at the margin the country faced an elastic demand 
curve.  
   6
Due to data limitations it does not seem a promising approach to build up CGE 
models for Brazil and Chile before the mid-20
th century. As initial interest here is on the 
links between import tariffs and commodity prices, and in most of the developing 
economy cases the relevant commodity answers for a very high proportion of total 
exports, it makes sense to follow Irwin (2003) and focus the analysis on the 
microeconomics of monopolist commodity producers. Figure 1 shows such an export 
market in partial equilibrium. Point A corresponds to equilibrium in the absence of an   
agreement to restrict exports: perfectly competitive domestic producers of the relevant 
commodity would sell the quantity Q1 where export supply equals export demand at the 
world price P1. The optimal quantity of exports is Q2 which corresponds to the point at 
which the marginal cost of export supply equals the marginal revenue from exports. This 
is simply the case when the country behaves as a monopolist in world market. As 
suggested by Irwin the government could ensure that this quantity is exported by 
imposing a tax so that the price received by domestic producers equals marginal cost at 
the quantity Q2. Irwin has cotton in the United States in mind and is concerned with the 
counterfactual imposition of an export tax.
11  
 
But there are alternative ways of affecting supply conditions besides export taxes. 
Tariffs on imported inputs affect the marginal cost conditions in the commodity export 
sector and thus the supply schedule.  The government can ensure that point B is reached 
by a combination of an export tax on the commodity and import taxes on inputs used in 
the commodity producing sector. But there is still another type of instrument that ought to 
be mentioned. Price support policies based on stockpiling have been adopted in countries 
with significant market power in commodity markets where supply could not be easily 
restricted.
12 The most important examples were the Brazilian coffee “valorisation” 
schemes from 1907 to the early 1960s. Transition from point A to point B in the more 
                                                 
11 The US Constitution has always prohibited the imposition of export taxes. 
12 Different types of barriers to entry were levied in order to guarantee control over supply. For instance, 
the Chilean government devised a system of mining licenses, whereas, following the Convênio de Taubaté 
in 1906, new coffee plantations in Brazil were restricted.   7
complete case could then depend on a combination of policies which included import and 
export taxes and price support.
13 
   
Figure 1 
 
    
  In the simpler case of an optimal export tax, t would be simply the reciprocal of 
the price elasticity of the commodity export demand. Following Irwin (2003), the 









1 , where P* is the 
world price and ηd is the (positive) elasticity of demand for the country’s exports. Since 
commodity’s domestic price would be given by P = P*(1-t), equating marginal revenue 
to the domestic price yields the optimal export tax: t = 1/ ηd.  In the more general case, 
where the export tax coexists with an import tax on inputs and commodity valorisation, 
one may think of t being substituted by T, where T is the market intervention required to 
make the specific commodity market to be exploited with full utilisation of market power 





                                                 
13 The government can also internalise monopoly profits, as Peru did in the late 1870s, when it purchased 











 P2(1-t)   8
 




Brazilian coffee exports in the 19
th century grew in line with world coffee 
consumption. The pace of growth was very fast at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century: four-fold in volume in the 1820s, two-fold in the 1830s and 1.7 times in the 
following decade. From 1851-1855 to 1901-1905 the volume of coffee exported grew at 
the yearly rate of 3.2%.
14 The share of coffee exports in total Brazilian exports was 
already almost 50% in 1850 and rose to almost 70% in the 1890s and 1920s. It fell below 
40% only in the 1940s (see Figure 2).  
 
Brazil captured a significant share of the world coffee market: it hovered around 
50% from mid-19
th century until the 1890s, then, after peaking in 1900s at more than 
80% it hovered around 70% until the early 1930s, steadily declining afterwards (see 
Figure 3). Brazil’s share of world’s coffee production was still higher than the share in 
world exports as stockpiling was adopted as a policy after 1907 and very significant 
coffee stocks were destroyed in the 1930s and early 1940s. The coffee exports-GDP ratio 
was around 9% in 1850 and reached more than 10% in 1900 and 1913. In 1928 it was 
slightly above 9%, but it fell with the collapse of coffee prices and diversification of the 
Brazilian economy to 4.8% in 1939.
15  
 
                                                 
14 See Abreu and Bevilaqua  (2000). 
15 See Abreu and Bevilaqua (2000), p. 37.   9
Figure 2 
Brazil: share of coffee exports in total exports, 1850-59 to 1950-1959 
                  Source: Abreu and Bevilaqua (2000). 
 
Figure 3 
Brazil: share in world coffee exports, 1852-1970 















































































































































The case of Brazil as an export economy with market power is particularly 
complex because there was a second commodity besides coffee that qualifies for 
inclusion. Rubber production became an important economic activity in Brazil towards 
the end of the 19
th century. Rubber exports were more than 14% of total exports in the 
1890s and a quarter of total exports in the 1900s. After peaking at 39% in 1910 this ratio 
fell rapidly in the following years as a consequence of Southeast Asian competition and 
was already under 3% in the 1920s. The Brazilian rubber golden age can be dated from 
the mid-1880s when exports exceeded the £1 million mark to 1912 when a peak of more 
than £16 million was reached. The Brazilian share in the world rubber market fell from 
the 50-60% level of the 1890s and 1910s to less than 10% in 1919. Peak rubber exports 
were almost equivalent to those of coffee, but in less exceptional years during the boom 
in the 1900s rubber exports were between a third and a half of coffee exports.
16 The 
relatively short period during which Brazil had market power in the world rubber market 
makes it particularly difficult to obtain meaningful econometric results in contrast with 
analysis based on other country-commodity pairs.




Chile, following the 1879-1883 Pacific War against Bolivia and Peru, obtained 
additional areas in the North which included valuable saltpetre mines that had become the 
main source of nitrates as guano reserves mainly in Peru were exhausted. The share of 
saltpetre exports in total Chilean exports rose from less than 40% in 1880 to a peak of 
almost 80% in the late 1900s and early 1910s, decreasing thereafter. Saltpetre lost ground 
in Chile’s exports due to the fact that synthetic substitutes started to undermine the 
country’s dominance in the world market. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Chilean saltpetre accounted for about 70% of the world supply of nitrogen fertiliser
18 and, 
on the verge of the World War I, 51.6% of the world fertiliser production came from 
                                                 
16 LeCointe (1922). 
17 See Fernandes (2002) for an attempt to explain the links between rubber prices and tariffs. 
18 Greenaway et al. (1978: 571).   11
Chilean saltpetre.
19 Fixed nitrogen was required not solely as a fertiliser but was also of 
prime national importance in the production of explosives. Even though efforts were 
concentrated to devise a method for chemically combining atmospheric nitrogen, only 
long after the discovery of the Haber-Bosch process, a commercial synthetic method 
became economically viable.
20 But that process was not adopted by other countries until 
the 1920s and, by 1930, only half of the world production of fixed nitrogen was by 
ammonia synthesis. After 1930 Chilean nitrate lost market share for chemical substitutes 






















































































































                                                 
19 Sutter and Sunkel (1982), figure for 1914. 
20 Greenaway et al. (1978). Competition stiffened from 1880 onwards due to two chemical substitutes: 
product nitrogen (being mainly sulphate of ammonia) and synthetic nitrogen. The former was a by-product 
of coal distillation in the manufacture of coke and artificial gas whereas the latter was produced by 
capturing nitrogen out of the air using three methods: the arc, cynamide or Haber-Bosch process. Even 
though product nitrogen was a serious competitor of Chilean’s saltpetre by 1914, only in the late 1920s, the 
Haber-Bosch process became the single largest source of non Chilean nitrogen (O’Brien, 1989). 
21 Greenaway et al. (1978: 572).   12
Cotton-United States 
 
Cotton in the first half of the 19
th century was produced mainly in plantations in 
the South of the United States which combined ample supply of good quality land and 
slaves with location advantages in terms of access to the British market. Between 70 and 
85% of British antebellum cotton imports originated in the United States (Figure 5). 
Cotton exports as a share of US exports, however, started to lose importance before the 
Civil War: after reaching a peak around 55-60% in the late 1830s and early 1840s they 
fell to the 35-45% range in the second half of the 1850s (Figure 6). Compared to Brazil 
and Chile, the US economy was much more successful in diversifying its exports. 
 
Figure 5 
United States: cotton market share in the British market, 1820-1861 































































































































































































Source: United States (1975). 
 
3. Market Power and Prices 
 
Since the commodities analysed here can be easily stored (leading to systematic 
mismatches between supply and demand) and production may respond to prices with a 
lag, the standard model where supply and demand are functions of current prices and 
determine the market price through a clearance condition does not seem appropriate.
22 
Standard reduced form equations for the determination of cotton, coffee and saltpetre 
prices (PRICE, in equation (1) below) were estimated in order to test the empirical 
relevance of the hypothesis that significant market shares in international markets of 
coffee, saltpetre and cotton by exports from the USA, Brazil and Chile respectively 
implied that domestic variables were relevant for the determination of the world prices of 
their corresponding exported commodity. 
 
Besides the lagged commodity price, which captures the inertia of the price 
formation system, another important explanatory variable is market pressure (MARKET), 
which is constructed as the ratio of world commodity consumption to the sum of world 
                                                 
22 De Vries (1975). The specifications discussed here build up on previous work presented in Abreu and 
Bevilaqua (2000) and Fernandes (2002).   14
commodity production and its corresponding stocks and is intended to capture supply-
demand balance in the world market.  
 
Costs related both to domestic and imported inputs are relevant in commodity 
price determination. Domestic costs refer to inputs produced domestically and used in the 
production of the commodity or consumed in the economy. External costs encompass all 
imported inputs used in the production process or consumed in the economy.  The 
domestic price level (divided by the nominal exchange rate) has been used as a measure 
of internal costs (INTERNAL_COST). The British price level or import prices in the 
commodity exporting countries (WORLD_COST) and the import tariff (TRF_IMP) have 
been used to define external costs. In the cases of Brazil-coffee and Chile-saltpetre an 
export tariff (TRF_EXP) has been included as an explanatory variable. As mentioned 
earlier, export tariffs were explicitly forbidden by the United States Constitution. Time 
lags in explanatory variables varied depending on lags between the decision to expand 
output and actual increase in production which could be as long as five years in the case 
of coffee. 
 
The more complete specification would be of the following form: 
 
PRICEt = C + β1PRICEt-d + β2MARKETt-d + β3WORLD_COSTt-d + β4INTERNAL_COSTt-d + 
β5TRF_IMPt-d + β6TRF_EXPt-d + Θt 
 
However, the estimated equations had a slightly different specification with a     
new variable called import cost (ICV) in substitution of the import tariff and the world 
price level. This new variable reflects the cost of imported inputs for the national 
producer and was constructed as the multiplication of the import tariff and the world 
price level. The reason to justify the use of this variable is that there is an inverse 
relationship between the price of commodities and the world price level, as shown in 
Table 3.1 below.  
   15
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
C 0.28 1.62% 0.26 9.30% 0.05 43.67%
IMPORT TARIFF(-1) 0.78 0.00% 0.88 0.00% 0.82 0.00%






















That negative relationship between the two components of ICV is likely to be related to 
the fact that the government aims at a given revenue target. If import prices rise, import 
tariff rates can be lowered and conversely. In the case of coffee and saltpetre the negative 
relation is more complicated due to the existence of an export tariff as well. Therefore, 
the government could achieve its target level of revenue through a combination of import 
and export tariffs. The non-significance of external prices in saltpetre equation suggests 
that Chilean government relied more heavily on export tariffs than Brazilian government 
did. This is confirmed by the fact that exports taxes vis-à-vis import taxes were relatively 
much more important in Chile than in Brazil in almost every year from 1880 to 1930 (see 






                                                 
23 It should be stressed that in Brazil, with the advent of the Republic in 1889, export tariffs were 
transferred to the control of the states while the import tariff remained in the hands of the Federal 
Government. This makes the comparison between export taxes and import taxes more difficult in the case 
of Brazil. Since the import rights/total revenue ratios cannot be used because the definition of total revenue 
would be different for Brazil (Federal plus States) and Chile (only Federal), the only way of comparison is 
through total export and import revenues in both countries. From 1880 to 1889, the comparison is fair. 
However, from 1889 on, there would be relevant missing data since there are data only for export revenues 
from São Paulo State: there are no reliable data for Minas Gerais (also mainly on coffee), Amazon and Pará 
(rubber) and Rio de Janeiro (the main harbour of Brazil). In order to tackle this problem, it was decided to 
calculate São Paulo export tariff excluding valorisation rights. This export tariff was then multiplied by 
Brazil total exports to obtain an estimate for Brazil export revenues to which valorisation tax proceeds 
collected only in São Paulo were added. This series was then compared to Brazil import revenues.   16
Figure 7 















































































































   Brazil    Chile  
Source: Diaz and Wagner (2004) and Brasil (1941), Brasil (1990), Fritsch (1988), Annuario Estatístico de São Paulo (several issues), 
Mappas Estatísticos do Commercio e Navegação do Porto do Rio de Janeiro (several issues), Balanço, Receita e Despeza do Império 
(several issues), Receita e Despeza da República (several issues), Report of Her Majesty's Secretaries of Embassy and Legation 
(1884), Mensagens Presidenciais da Província de São Paulo (several issues) and Relatório da Fazenda do Estado de São Paulo (several 
issues). 
 
Analysis of the relation between commodity prices and export tariffs (see Table 
3.2) also suggest an inverse relationship, more intense in the case of Chile-Saltpetre than 
for Brazil-Coffee. 
   17
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
C 0.05 4.35% 0.27 0.00%
EXPORT TARIFF(-1) 0.78 0.00% 0.66 0.00%





















4. Empirical results and model adjustment 
 
The adjusted specification to take into account the comments included in the 
previous section would then be: 
 
PRICEt = C + β1PRICEt-d + β2MARKETt-d + β3INTERNAL_COSTt-d + β4ICVt-d + β5TRF_EXPt-d + Θt 
 
The above equation was estimated for coffee (1880-1930), cotton (1826-1858) 
and saltpetre (1880-1929) and the results are shown in the Table 3.3 below. All fits were 
quite good. Coffee price is explained by its one and two-year lags, market pressure and 
ad valorem import tariff both with a 5-year lag.
24 All coefficients are statistically 
significant at least at the 10% confidence level, except market pressure which is only 
significant at the 15% confidence level. It is worth noticing that the ICV-elasticity of 
coffee price is 0.38, suggesting that Brazilian coffee growers were successful in passing 
through increases of the level of protection to the price of coffee. 
 
  The cotton price equation also corroborates the hypothesis of a link between the 
cost of imported inputs and the price of cotton. As it can be seen from the Table 3.3 
below, cotton price is explained by its one-year lag, ICV and market pressure also lagged 
one year and the current price of slaves. All coefficients show the expected sign and are 
                                                 
24 The reason for the five year lag is that in the relevant period production started 5 years after coffee trees 
were planted (Rowe, 1936: 37).   18
statistically significant at least at the 10% confidence level, with the exception of ICV’s, 
which is only statistically significant at 15% confidence level. It should also be 
emphasised that cotton was the only commodity in Table 3.1 for which internal costs 
(measured by slave prices) were a relevant explanatory variable of cotton price. For 
coffee and saltpetre, series of internal prices and/or wage level were used without 
success. 
 
Saltpetre price equation showed the best fit and as in the case of cotton and coffee, 
all coefficients showed the expected sign and were statistically significant at least at the 
15% confidence level. In fact, the ICV coefficient is statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. However, due to the lack of a series of stocks, the saltpetre equation 
does not contain a variable to capture market pressure.
25 It is worth noting that the 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for up to three-order ARMA errors was 
applied for all equations presented in Table 3.3 and serial correlation was ruled out 
through the use of lags of the dependent variable. 
 
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
C -1.40 7.91% -4.92 0.16% -0.73 6.22%
PRICE(-1) 0.88 0.00% 0.29 7.52% 0.38 0.24%
PRICE(-2) -0.26 7.45% - - - -
ICV(-1) - - 0.26 14.04% 0.48 0.00%
ICV(-5) 0.38 0.80% - - - -
MARKET(-1) - - 0.60 0.16% - -
MARKET(-5) 0.31 12.55% - - - -


















                                                 
25 There was an attempt to construct a series of market pressure for saltpetre using the difference between 
production and consumption and setting an initial level of stocks so that there were no negative stocks in 
any year ahead. Nonetheless, that variable showed no statistical significance in explaining the price of 
saltpetre.   19
 
The specification whose results were presented in Table 3.3 was expanded to 
include the export tariff. Results are presented in Table 3.4 except for cotton as there was 
no export tariff in the United States. Coefficients for the export tariff showed statistical 
significance and the predicted sign in all equations. While the previous results do not 
change
26, there are some quantitative implications; the most obvious one being the 
improvement in the fit of all equations and also in the p-values for all coefficients
27. 
 
Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
C -2.51 0.75% -4.92 0.16% -1.35 1.06%
PRICE(-1) 0.92 0.00% 0.29 7.52% 0.47 0.05%
PRICE(-2) -0.27 5.30% - - - -
ICV(-1) - - 0.26 14.04% 0.51 0.00%
ICV(-5) 0.52 0.09% - - - -
EXPORT TARIFF(-1) 2.57 3.04% - - 0.86 7.70%
MARKET(-1) - - 0.60 0.16% - -
M A R K E T ( - 5 ) 0 . 4 2 3 . 7 2 % -- --



















Firstly, the market pressure-coffee price elasticity increased from 0.31 to 0.42, 
indicating that market pressure is in fact more important to explain the coffee price level 
than results in the less complete specification suggested. Secondly, whilst for saltpetre the 
ICV coefficient did not change in statistical terms, for coffee it increased more 
significantly so that coffee and saltpetre prices respond similarly to an increase in the 
                                                 
26 As done for equations presented in Table 3.3, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for up to 
three-order ARMA errors was also applied to all equations of Table 3.4 and any serial correlation in the 
three equations presented in Table 3.3 was ruled out. 
27 The Likelihood Ratio test was used to verify whether TRF_EXP makes a significant contribution to 
explaining the variation in the commodity price. In both equations the null hypothesis that the TRF_EXP 
do not belong to the equations was rejected at a 15% significance level.   20
import tariff level although with a rather different lag structure. Cotton price is much less 
sensitive to tariff level variations. Thirdly, export tariff elasticity was much higher for 
coffee than for saltpetre. In fact, export tariff elasticity in the coffee equation was 
substantially higher than one. This poses no problem since a reduced model in which 
price is the dependent variable was estimated instead of the traditional model of supply 
and demand. It can be shown that the magnitude of the export tariff elasticity in the 
reduced form depends on how much the export tariff-supply elasticity is higher than the 
price-demand elasticity, there being no requirement that our estimate should be below 1. 
 
Producers of coffee and saltpetre responded more to export tariffs than they did to 
internal costs and market pressures. This might have happened due to the fact that export 
tariff is the more direct instrument the government had for changing marginal costs and 
then the easiest one for producers to measure and pass through. Nonetheless, comparing 
coffee and cotton equations, it can be inferred that cotton price responded more to market 
pressures than to internal costs whereas coffee price did the opposite. This result is in line 
with findings that United States could not have exploited fully its market position due to 
the fact that it faced an elastic demand curve at the margin as it was a price taker for food 
exports.
28 Conversely, Brazilian government might have been more successful in 




The paper focused on market power by certain countries in specific commodity 
markets as a crucial factor in explaining the history of protection. It was argued that a 
country which is a price maker in the world market of a specific commodity might affect 
the world price of this commodity through three main mechanisms: export taxes, import 
taxes on inputs used to produce the exported commodity and commodity stockpiling. 
Previous analyses on the explanation for the high level of protection in specific 
economies, especially in Latin America, should be revised since they did not take into 
account market power of each country in commodity world markets. 
                                                 
28 Harley (1992).   21
 
There is strong evidence to support this hypothesis. Standard reduced form 
equations for the determination of cotton, coffee and saltpetre prices were estimated in 
order to test if significant market shares in international markets of coffee, saltpetre and 
cotton by exports from the USA, Brazil and Chile, respectively, implied that domestic 
variables were relevant for the determination of the world prices of their corresponding 
exported commodity.  Econometric results suggest that those countries were successful in 
passing through increases in internal costs to the world price of their respective exported 
commodity. 
 
The political economy of protection in those countries was somewhat different 
from what was normally observed in a price taker country. Whenever an internal lobby 
succeeded in increasing the level of protection, there would be not such a strong incentive 
from exporters to lobby for the reestablishment of the initial status quo since they could   
at least partly pass through the increase in their costs to the final consumer. These 
qualifications would probably be even stronger in economies such as Brazil where it is 
difficult to distinguish between export interests and interests focused on import 
substituting industries.  
 
Different national experiences indicate different combinations of instruments 
which could be used to move an economy towards equilibrium where market power 
would be fully exploited. In Brazil, all three instruments have been used: export taxes, 
import taxes on inputs and stockpiling. In Chile, only export taxes and import taxes on 
inputs, and in the United States only import taxes on inputs. 
 
There are sharp contrasts between the production processes of coffee, saltpetre 
and cotton. In the relevant period a coffee tree became productive only five years after it 
was planted. Cotton was planted every year. Saltpetre rate of production was flexible 
within certain limits: there was indivisibility related to mining capacity, but no 
insurmountable constraints on adjustments to reduce output.   Once coffee trees were in 
production the coffee industry was like an industrial line of production whose output was   22
invariant, given weather conditions (no frosts) and current expenditures on maintenance 
of the trees in good shape. This to a large extent explains why stockpiling was relevant 
for coffee as this was the only way to regulate supply flows to demand. Saltpetre 
producers could almost always adjust the rate of output. Cotton growers could adjust each 
year how much cotton they wished to plant. 
 
Export taxes were not constitutionally allowed in the United States allegedly 
because the South feared the imposition of an export tax on cotton.
29 They were relatively 
more important in Chile than in Brazil and this might have been linked to the fact that 
they were provincial taxes in Brazil for most of the period while import taxes were a 
large share of central government revenues. Attention should also be drawn to the fact 
that costs of coordination of output decisions were much lower for saltpetre – and in 
principle for cotton – than for coffee producers as there were only a few salitreras in 
Chile
30 and tens of thousands of coffee growers.
31 
 
The paper does not discuss welfare implications. This should be the subject of further 
research. The countries analysed here were dominant producers of specific commodities. 
The imposition of import taxes generated a deadweight loss due to distortions in 
production and consumption but these were outweighed by price increases entailed by 
higher prices paid by consumers who bore the burden of the taxation. Similarly, higher 
commodity prices made possible by taxation of commodity exports outweighed welfare 




                                                 
29 See Stiglitz (1988:46). It is likely, however, that cotton importers rather than cotton exporters would bear 
the brunt of such an export tax.  
30 The number rose from 18 in 1870-72 to about 50 in the 1890s, less than 140 before World War I and a 
little more than 50 in the early 1920s. Many firms owned more than one salitrera. See Sutter and Sunkel 
(1990). 




Price: Ellison (1968). 
Import Tariff: free and dutiable, #U211 series, United States (1975). 
Slave Price: Price of Prime Field Hand, Table 17, Conrad and Meyer (1958: 117). 
Market: consumption, production and stocks from Ellison (1968). 
Import Price: #E94 series from United States (1975), wholesale price index (Taylor) for 
Charleston S.C., Foreign Imports for 1826-43 and price index of British exports 
from Imlah (1958: 94-98) for 1843 and henceforth. 
Sauer: Sauerbeck, A. (1904 and henceforth), Prices of Commodities and the Precious 




Price: world price of ton of saltpetre, Table 4.9, series (3), in Braun et al. (2000: 132) 
Import Tariff: Diaz and Wagner (2004). 
Export Tariff: Diaz and Wagner (2004). 
Domestic Prices: consumer price index, Table 4.1, series (1), in Braun et al. (2000: 100) 
Exchange Rate: nominal exchange rate, pesos chilenos against dollar (annual average), 
Table 4.1, series (4), in Braun et al. (2000: 118) 
Sauer: Sauerbeck, A. (1904 and henceforth), Prices of Commodities and the Precious 
Metals, JRSS. In: Mitchell and Deane (1971). 
Coffee 
 
Price: Santos type 7 coffee, US cents per pound, calendar years, from Thurber (1881) for 
1833-1880 and Bacha and Greenhill (1992) for 1881-1960. 
Import Tariff: average import tariffs computed from Brasil (1941), Brasil (1990) and 
Fritsch (1988). 
Export Tariff: ad valorem export tariff for Brazil was computed as the sum of Federal ad 
valorem tariff with São Paulo state ad valorem tariff. Exports data came from 
Brasil (1990) and Annuario Estatístico de São Paulo (several issues) while   24
exports rights came from Mappas Estatísticos do Commercio e Navegação do 
Porto do Rio de Janeiro (several issues), Balanço, Receita e Despeza do Império 
(several issues), Receita e Despeza da República (several issues), Report of Her 
Majesty's Secretaries of Embassy and Legation (1884), Mensagens Presidenciais 
da Província de São Paulo (several issues) and Relatório da Fazenda do Estado 
de São Paulo (several issues). 
Market: consumption, production and stocks: Bacha and Greenhill (1992), Statistical 
Appendix. 
Domestic Price Index: Catão (1992) from 1880 to 1913 and Haddad (1978) from 1914 to 
1930. 
Exchange Rate: Brasil (1941). 
Sauer: Sauerbeck, A. (1904 and henceforth), Prices of Commodities and the Precious 
Metals, JRSS. In: Mitchell and Deane (1971).   25
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